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| The following is a copy of a NZ Listener
article from 1986 written by Lloyd Geering (reproduced with
his permission), called 'Our Obligation to Animals' |
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| Getting to the
heart of the moral issue |
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A debate that surfaces periodically concerns
the export of live sheep to countries such as Saudi Arabia.
Opposing views are argued on widely different grounds. Farmers
strongly support live exports on economic grounds, as a welcome
relief in the face of uncertain markets; they see little difference
between having their sheep slaughtered here or overseas. Opposing
them for industrial reasons are freezing workers, who fear that
this type of export endangers their livelihood. Other objections
come from an undefinable section of the community. This group
base their objections on moral grounds, claiming that live exports
subject the animals to unjustifiable suffering.
It is only right that the moral issue here should override both
economic and industrial aspects. But how is the moral issue
to be clearly expounded? Do animals have rights? Do humans have
a categorical obligation never to harm or cause suffering to
animals? Where does one draw the line between preventing suffering
and yet allowing slaughter? In attempting to answer these thorny
questions, it is easy to succumb to sentimentality or to doggedly
- and illogically - apply some supposed moral absolute. We can,
however, gain some guidance in these arguments by looking at
the historical development of human moral consciousness in regard
to animals. Although some claim that the modern animal welfare
movement originated in the matrix of Protestant Christianity,
it owes just as much to the rise of the free thought movement
stemming from the Enlightenment.
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| Dominion
over animals: a traditional Christian view |
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Traditional Christianity had remarkably little
to say on the proper treatment of animals. We can find isolated
examples of compassion: the Ten Commandments decreed that domestic
animals should also enjoy rest on the Sabbath and Deuteronomy
forbade the puzzling of an ox while it was treading out the
grain. However, such examples did not have a strong influence
on Christian thought. Indeed, St Paul interpreted the ox injunction
metaphorically as referring to human rights, rather than as
implying any divine concern for oxen.
The attitude to animals that took shape in the Christian tradition
was chiefly based on the creation myth in Genesis. Humankind,
it is said in Genesis, has been given "dominion over the
fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and every living creature
that moves on the Earth". Christians claimed that this
position of dominance gave humans absolute rights to use and
kill animals as they saw fit.
Thomas Aquinas, the supreme medieval Christian authority, was
thus led to declare, "It matters not how man behaves to
animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power
... God does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other
animals". Although he disapproved of cruelty to animals,
he did so on the grounds that he thought it would encourage
humans to be cruel to one another.
It was due to the continuing influence of Aquinas that Pope
Pius IX, in the mid 19th century, refused to allow the Royal
Society of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) to be established
in Rome. His argument was that it would imply that humans have
duties towards animals. The traditional Roman Catholic position
was all too clearly expressed by Jesuit Joseph Rickaby: "...
we have no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, towards
the lower animals, neither to sticks nor stones."
The traditional Protestant views were similar. Major Hume of
the Universities' Federation for Animal Welfare has claimed
that "the minds of most theologians have been hermetically
sealed against the fact that animals exist and have rights".
Even philosopher Immanuel Kant could write in the late 18th
century "so far as animals are concerned we have no direct
duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely
as a means to an end. That end is man." |
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| Our growing
moral sense |
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Clearly, then, the first changes in attitudes
to animals did not emerge from official spokespeople of the
churches. To the contrary, Scottish philosopher and sceptic
David Hume may have been one of the first to voice the change
when he wrote that "we are bound by the laws of humanity
to give gentle usage to these creatures".
Then in 1780 legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham compared the position
of animals with that of black slaves; human tyranny had taken
away the rights of both groups and he looked forward to the
day when these rights would be restored. He may have been the
first to denounce the biblical tradition of "man's dominion
over the animals" as tyranny rather than legitimate rule.
It may well be that human kindness to animals was becoming more
widespread during the long period of domestication of some animal
species, when humans and animals were in close contact (frequently
living under the same roof). But in the 19th century we can
see evidence of the emergence of a sense of moral responsibility
for animal welfare.
In 1882 the first British law protecting domestic animals from
wanton mistreatment was passed. This law applied to horses and
donkeys but, strangely, not yet to cats or dogs. It was because
of the need to enforce this law that the RSPCA came to be established.
Its purpose was to speak up for animals who obviously could
not speak for themselves. |
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| Growth of the
new moral sense |
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Many factors promoted the growth of this
new moral sense of responsibility for animal welfare in western
thought. Chief among them, as a result of Darwinism and an understanding
of evolution, is the recognition of our essential kinship with
all other forms of planetary life. This sense of kinship has
a long history in other cultures such as the Indian tradition,
frequently leading to prohibitions on slaughtering animals and
eating animal flesh.
The relatively late emergence of any such sense in the west
may mean that the west is only at the beginning of developing
an adequate moral understanding of our human responsibility
to animals. Certainly cockfighting, bear-baiting and bullfighting
are widely condemned on moral grounds. But can blood sports
of any kind, including hunting, fishing and shooting, be morally
justified?
Those who wish to justify morally the export of live sheep can
readily claim that it is far less cruel than some of the modern
mass-farming methods for producing veal, poultry and pork. (In
this regard you may be shocked by Peter Singer's bestseller,
Animal Liberation, in which he expounds a new ethic for our
treatment of animals.) In modern consciousness there seems to
be a rising level of concern for our fellow non-human creatures.
It does not rest on any specific moral injunction of the Christian
tradition and may be in conflict with some. Yet once we recognise
our kinship with the other living inhabitants of this planet,
then all the caring values that Christianity has proclaimed
for humans can be readily extended to all forms of life. |
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| No end in sight |
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| But our new morality is likely to lead us
on to many challenges far beyond improving the conditions in
the sheep export trade to an acceptable standard. Blood sports,
the widespread experimentation on animals in our laboratories,
mass-farming methods and even the eating of animal flesh will
come under increasing scrutiny. It is claimed that the growth
of vegetarianism in the western world is already a significant
reason for the decline of the meat trade. It may well be that
in the long term New Zealand's economy may have to undergo a
radical change as a result of our changing morality. |
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